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Calculating SEC Whistleblower
Awards:
A Theoretical Approach
Amanda M. Rose*
The Dodd-Frank Act provides that Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) whistleblower awards must equal not less than ten and
not more than thirty percent of the monetary penalties collected in the action to
which they relate; SEC Rule 21F-6 provides criteria that the SEC may consider
in determining the award percentage within the statutory bounds. When
applying the Rule 21F-6 criteria, the SEC is required to think only in percentage
terms, ignoring the dollar payout the award will actually yield. Last June, the
SEC proposed to change this, at least in cases where the existing methodology
would yield an award less than $2 million or greater than $30 million. The
proposed revisions to Rule 21F-6 have garnered controversy and have not yet
been implemented. Do they make sense? To begin to answer that question
requires an understanding of the purpose of whistleblower awards and an
evaluation of how well the existing award calculation methodology advances
that purpose. This Article provides both. The analysis suggests that the
controversial proposed amendments to Rule 21F-6 are warranted but
incomplete.
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INTRODUCTION
After eight years in operation, the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (“SEC”) Whistleblower Program is undergoing
retrospective review. Last summer, the SEC put out for public comment
a lengthy release proposing a variety of amendments to the program’s
rules.1 Among the most controversial is a proposed amendment to Rule
21F-6, which sets forth the criteria for determining the amount of
whistleblower awards. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, which created the whistleblower program,
requires that the aggregate amount awarded to an eligible
whistleblower or group of whistleblowers whose tip(s) led to a “covered
action”—defined as an SEC action in which monetary sanctions in
excess of $1 million are ordered—equal not less than ten percent and
not more than thirty percent of the monetary sanctions collected in the
covered action and certain related actions.2 Within this range, the
statute grants the SEC discretion to determine the award amount while
setting forth certain nonexclusive criteria that the SEC shall take into
consideration in the exercise of its discretion.3 Rule 21F-6, in turn, lists
factors (including but not limited to those specified in the statute) that
the SEC may consider “[i]n exercising its discretion to determine the
appropriate award percentage.”4 These factors may cause the SEC to,
in its discretion, “increase or decrease the award percentage.”5
As written, Rule 21F-6 requires that the SEC consider these
criteria in determining the appropriate award percentage, seemingly
without regard to the total dollars the award would yield for the
whistleblower. SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has dubbed this “the

1.
Whistleblower Program Rules, 83 Fed. Reg. 34702 (proposed July 20, 2018) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249).
2.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012).
3.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1).
4.
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6 (2019).
5.
Id.
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percentage formula” for determining whistleblower awards;6 this article
will refer to it as “the percentage method.” The proposed revisions to
Rule 21F-6 would free the SEC to consider the dollar amount of an
award, but only in circumscribed ways and under limited
circumstances: when an award determined using the percentage
method would be very small in dollar terms (in which case an upward
adjustment may be warranted) and, more controversially, when it
would be extremely large in dollar terms (in which case a downward
adjustment may be warranted).7 Commissioner Jackson and former
Commissioner Stein have expressed concern that affording the SEC
discretion to adjust downward large dollar awards may jeopardize the
goals of the whistleblower program.8
A fundamental question is lurking in this debate: Why should
the percentage method be the baseline for determining SEC
whistleblower awards in the first place? Congress did not debate this
question before imposing the requirement that whistleblower awards
must equal between ten and thirty percent of the amount of monetary
sanctions collected in a covered action.9 Nor does it appear that the SEC
thought hard about this question when it decided to restrict itself to the
percentage method as a way of determining what an award should be
within the statutory ten to thirty percent range. The only statement
concerning the methodology the SEC made when adopting Rule 21F-6
was that it was “[s]imilar to the approach used by the Department of
Justice and Internal Revenue Service” (“IRS”) in their payment of
whistleblower awards under the False Claims Act and IRS
Whistleblowers Program, respectively.10 The percentage method also

6.
Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting on
Amendments to the Commission’s Whistleblower Program Rules (June 28, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-open-meeting-amendments-commissionswhistleblower-program-rules [https://perma.cc/HN4F-9N3B].
7.
See infra Section II.C.
8.
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Proposed Rules
Regarding SEC Whistleblower Program (June 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/jackson-statement-whistleblowers-062818 [https://perma.cc/4YYM-6KZZ]; Kara M.
Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Proposed Amendments to the
Commission’s Whistleblower Program Rules (June 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-stein-whistleblower-062818 [https://perma.cc/B7US-JHH2].
9.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REP. NO. 511, EVALUATION OF
SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 22
(2013),
https://www.sec.gov/files/511.pdf
THE
[https://perma.cc/5ZU8-273A] [hereinafter OIG REPORT] (“[W]histleblower award amounts were
not a debated part of the Dodd-Frank Act.”).
10. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, Exchange Act Release No. 3464,545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,331 (June 13, 2011) [hereinafter WP Release]. Subject to various
requirements, the former entitles those who bring a qui tam suit on behalf of the government to
between fifteen and thirty percent of the proceeds of the action, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012), and
the latter entitles individuals who tip off the IRS about tax evaders to bounties between ten and
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resembles the preferred approach for determining the fee award paid to
class action attorneys. But these analogies, while superficially
appealing, do not necessarily support use of the percentage method in
the context of SEC whistleblower awards.
This Article returns to first principles, articulating what an
award calculation methodology should strive to achieve in light of the
purpose of the whistleblower program and exploring how well the
percentage method lives up to these expectations. It proceeds in four
parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the SEC’s whistleblower
program. Part II explains in greater detail the current method
employed by the SEC for determining the amount of whistleblower
awards, reports data on the whistleblower awards that the SEC has
granted to date, and describes the recently proposed amendments to
Rule 21F-6 and the controversy they have provoked.
Section III.A then considers the purpose of the whistleblower
program. The starting premise is that the whistleblower program is
designed to encourage tips by altering the internal cost-benefit
calculation a potential whistleblower might be expected to conduct
when deciding whether to come forward. But encouraging tips is not an
end in itself: it is a means to help the SEC in its deterrence mission.
Not all tips will have this effect; to the contrary, some will impose more
costs than benefits on the SEC. Thus, a more refined statement of the
goal of the whistleblower program is to encourage desirable tips (that
is, those that create more benefits than costs, and thus push the SEC
closer to its goal of optimal deterrence) without simultaneously
encouraging the submission of undesirable tips (namely, those that
create net costs, and thus undermine the SEC’s deterrence objective).
Section III.B evaluates how well the percentage method
advances this purpose. It demonstrates that the percentage method
laudably creates differential incentives to report based on tip
desirability. All else equal, whistleblowers with relatively more
desirable tips should expect higher awards than those with relatively
less desirable tips, meaning they will find the benefits of reporting to
exceed the costs more often. But the percentage method does not ensure
that awards will not vastly exceed what is necessary to incentivize
whistleblowers with desirable tips to come forward. Nor does it ensure
that awards will not be so high as to encourage even undesirable tips
or, conversely, that they will be high enough so as to encourage
desirable tips. This will all depend on how the expected value of awards
compares to the actual costs whistleblowers expect to bear by coming
thirty percent of the taxes the IRS collects as a result of the tip, 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2012); Discovery
of Liability and Enforcement of Title, 26 C.F.R. § 301.7623-4 (2019).
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forward. The percentage method, as currently applied, is insensitive to
actual whistleblower costs.
Part IV explains that the proposed reforms to Rule 21F-6 would
fix this problem in the subset of cases to which they would apply by
inviting the SEC to consider the dollar amount of the award and to
make adjustments depending on how the amount would affect
whistleblower incentives. While the analysis suggests that the proposed
reforms to Rule 21F-6 are warranted, it also suggests two additional
reforms that could improve the functioning of the whistleblower
program. First, tethering awards to the value of all penalties imposed
in the covered action rather than simply to monetary penalties collected
would better align whistleblowers’ incentives to tip with the SEC’s
deterrence mission. Second, the SEC should be required to be more
transparent about the percentages it awards and why. The SEC almost
never publicly discloses the percentage it decides to award. This opacity
is unnecessary and likely increases the risk discount that potential
whistleblowers apply to expected awards when deciding whether the
benefits of tipping outweigh the costs.
I. THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM: A SHORT PRIMER
The current framework for the SEC Whistleblower Program
(“WP”) is laid out in the Dodd-Frank Act11 and in SEC implementing
rules adopted in 2011.12 The program entitles “whistleblowers”—
defined as individuals (not corporations or other entities) who provide
the SEC with information about possible securities law violations
pursuant to specified procedures13—to a monetary award if they meet
the following criteria. First, a whistleblower must have provided
information to the SEC “voluntarily.”14 Second, that information must
have been “original.”15 Third, the information must have “led to” a
successful SEC enforcement action resulting in more than $1 million in
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
12. See WP Release, supra note 10.
13. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1) (2019).
14. This requires, inter alia, that the whistleblower submit the tip before the SEC requests
information from the whistleblower related to the subject matter of the submission and that the
whistleblower not be under a pre-existing legal duty to report the information to the SEC. See
Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower Program Changes
the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1235, 1261 (2014) (discussing the
meaning of “voluntarily”).
15. “Original information” is defined in the Dodd-Frank Act as information that is derived
from a whistleblower’s “independent knowledge or analysis” and “is not known to the [SEC] from
any other source, unless the whistleblower is the original source of the information.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(a)(3); see also Rose, supra note 14 at 1262−63 (discussing the meaning of “original
information”).
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monetary sanctions (a so-called “covered action”).16 Finally, the
whistleblower must not otherwise be ineligible for an award.17 Upon
meeting these criteria and adhering to other procedural requirements
for claiming an award, the whistleblower is entitled by statute to share
in a whistleblower award of between ten and thirty percent of the
sanctions collected in the covered action and in certain “related
actions.”18
The SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower (“OWB”), housed within
the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, is tasked with administering the
WP.19 The OWB is currently staffed by a chief, two assistant directors,
thirteen attorneys, four paralegals, and an administrative assistant.20
Among other things, the OWB maintains a website that provides
information about the WP as well as links to the forms required to
submit a tip (Form TCR) and apply for an award (Form WB-APP).21 The
OWB ensures that any Form TCR it receives by mail or fax is inputted
into the SEC’s Tips, Complaints, and Referrals System (the “TCR
System”), a centralized database for the “prioritization, assignment,
and tracking of TCRs received from the public.”22

16. See Rose, supra note 14, at 1263−65 (discussing the meaning of “leading to success”).
17. See id. at 1265−68 (discussing ineligibility).
18. See id. at 1268−70. A “related action” exists if it is based upon the same original
information that led to the covered action and is brought by the Attorney General of the United
States, an “appropriate regulatory agency,” an SRO, or a state Attorney General in a criminal case.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(5); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3(b)(1) (2019). “Appropriate regulatory agency means
the [SEC], the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and any other
agencies that may be defined as appropriate regulatory agencies under Section 3(a)(34) of the
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(34) (2012)).” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(f) (2019). To receive an award
based on a related action, the SEC must determine that the original information the whistleblower
gave to the SEC also led to the successful enforcement of the related action under the same criteria
used to evaluate awards for covered actions. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3(b)(2).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7(d) (discussing administration and enforcement).
20. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM 6 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/sec-2018-annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M43U-VV77] [hereinafter WP 2018 REPORT].
21. See
Office
of
the
Whistleblower,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/QBP2-P6UA].
22. Sarah N. Lynch & Matthew Goldstein, Exclusive: SEC Builds New Tips Machine to Catch
the Next Madoff, REUTERS (July 27, 2011) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-secinvestigations/exclusive-sec-builds-new-tips-machine-to-catch-the-next-madoffidUSTRE76Q2NY20110727 [https://perma.cc/NV8J-K3HF]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL
REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 2012 4 (2012),
https://www.sec.gov/files/annual-report-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9T8-HBUQ] [hereinafter WP
2012 REPORT]. Whistleblowers also have the option to input their tip directly into the TCR System
via an online version of Form TCR. For more information on the TCR System, see Ben Protess &
Azem Ahmed, With New Firepower, SEC Tracks Bigger Game, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 21,
2012),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/with-new-firepower-s-e-c-tracks-bigger-game/
[https://perma.cc/F9EC-374D]; Bruce Carton, Details Emerge on SEC Office of Market Intelligence,

Rose_PAGE

2019]

11/16/2019 6:29 PM

CALCULATING SEC WHISTLEBLOWER AWARDS

2053

Once in the TCR System, a whistleblower’s tip is triaged by the
Enforcement Division’s Office of Market Intelligence (“OMI”).23 The
OMI evaluates each tip and assigns those identified as “sufficiently
specific, timely, and credible to warrant the further allocation of [SEC]
resources” to appropriate enforcement staff.24 As the SEC’s
investigation proceeds, the OWB serves as a liaison between the
whistleblower (or his or her lawyer) and enforcement staff. It also works
with enforcement staff to track enforcement cases involving
whistleblowers “to assist in the documentation of the whistleblower’s
information and cooperation in anticipation of an eventual claim for
award.”25
After a final judgment is entered in a covered action, the OWB
posts on its website a “Notice of Covered Action.”26 Whistleblowers then
have ninety days to file a claim for an award based on that covered
action, using Form WB-APP.27 After the deadline for filing an appeal of
the covered action has passed or, if an appeal has been filed, after the
appeal has concluded, the SEC will evaluate all whistleblower claims
that have been timely filed in connection with the action.28 It will
determine whether any of the claimants meet the criteria for a
whistleblower award and, if so, the appropriate percentage of collected
sanctions to award them.29 A whistleblower can appeal the SEC’s final
decision denying his or her entitlement to an award, but an SEC
decision regarding the amount of an award (including the allocation of
an award as between multiple whistleblowers) is not appealable so long
as the aggregate award falls within the required ten to thirty percent
range.30
In addition to requiring the payment of whistleblower awards on
the terms set forth above, the Dodd-Frank Act also contains provisions
to protect SEC whistleblowers from workplace retaliation. Employers
are prohibited from discriminating against whistleblowers in the terms
and conditions of employment because they have provided information
SECURITIESDOCKET (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/02/09/details-emergeon-sec-office-of-market-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/F3Z4-6LV4].
23. Protess & Ahmed, supra note 22.
24. WP 2012 REPORT, supra note 22, at 5. “When appropriate, tips that fall within the
jurisdiction of another federal or state agency are forwarded to the [SEC] contact at that
agency . . . .” Id.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(a) (2019).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(a)–(b).
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(d).
29. This involves multiple layers of review. See WP 2012 REPORT, supra note 22, at 7; OIG
REPORT, supra note 9, at 5.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-13(a) (2019).
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to the SEC or have assisted the SEC in an investigation or prosecution
related to that information.31 The SEC can enforce this provision.32
Moreover, a whistleblower who believes his or her employer has
violated this provision may sue for reinstatement, two times any back
pay owed, and fees and costs.33 Unlike Sarbanes-Oxley’s antiretaliation
provision, which requires that claims be brought through the
Department of Labor,34 the WP’s antiretaliation provision allows
whistleblowers to sue their employers directly in federal court.35 It also
affords plaintiffs a more generous statute of limitations.36 To be entitled
to this protection, whistleblowers need not qualify for a whistleblower
award; it is sufficient that they possessed a “reasonable belief” that the
information they provided to the SEC was related to a “possible
securities law violation.”37
The SEC is also required to keep a whistleblower’s identity
confidential unless and until it is required to be disclosed to a defendant
in a public proceeding or unless the SEC deems it necessary to share it
with certain other authorities (in which case those authorities must
keep it confidential).38 A whistleblower also has the option of remaining
anonymous up to the point of receiving payment of a whistleblower
award, at which time the whistleblower’s identity must be disclosed to
the SEC.39 Anonymous Form TCRs must be submitted through an
attorney, however, and the whistleblower must provide that attorney
with a declaration under penalty of perjury that the information on the
form is true and correct.40 (Nonanonymous whistleblowers must make
such a declaration directly on their Form TCRs.41) Finally, the WP
makes it unlawful for anyone to take actions that impede an individual
31. The retaliation provision also protects individuals who have made disclosures that are
required or protected under Sarbanes-Oxley and a variety of other laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A) (2012) (explaining protections).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(2) (2019).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C).
34. See OSHA Fact Sheet: Filing Whistleblower Complaints Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha-factsheet-soxact.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/PL2X-FF2D] (employees must file complaint
with OSHA).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii). For a discussion of the problems with Sarbanes-Oxley’s
anti-retaliation provision, see Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1757, 1764–67 (2007). For a discussion of how the WP’s anti-retaliation provision seeks to
avoid these problems, see Rachel Beller, Note, Whistleblower Legislation of the East and West, 7
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 873, 914–15 (2011).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(i).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7(a) (2019).
39. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-7(b), 240.21F-9(c), 240.21F-10(c) (2019).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-7(b)(1), 240.21F-9(c).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-9(b).
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from becoming a whistleblower, including by threatening to enforce a
confidentiality agreement.42
II. CALCULATING AWARDS: CURRENT PRACTICE, PROPOSED REFORMS
The SEC recently issued a lengthy release proposing numerous
amendments to the rules governing the WP. Of particular interest for
purposes of this Article are proposed amendments to Rule 21F-6, which
governs the way in which the SEC determines the size of whistleblower
awards. This Part describes the currently prescribed method for
calculating whistleblower awards and the track record of awards
granted using this methodology. It also explains the proposed
modifications to Rule 21F-6.
A. Current Methodology for Determining Award Amounts
If one or more whistleblowers meet the eligibility criteria for an
award and follow the required procedures for making a claim, the SEC
is statutorily required to award them, in the aggregate, at least ten but
not more than thirty percent of the monetary sanctions collected in the
covered action.43 The SEC is also statutorily required to pay eligible
whistleblowers an amount equal to ten to thirty percent of the monetary
sanctions collected in “related actions,”44 if specified claims procedures
are followed.45
The Dodd-Frank Act leaves the determination of the amount of
an award, within the ten to thirty percent statutory bounds, to the
SEC’s discretion.46 The Act provides, however, that in exercising this
discretion the SEC shall take into consideration:
(I) [T]he significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to the success of
the covered judicial or administrative action;

42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17. The SEC has taken steps to enforce this prohibition. See
HomeStreet, Inc. and Darrell van Amen, Exchange Act Release No. 79844, 115 SEC Docket 5879,
2017 WL 218847 (Jan. 19, 2017) (finding HomeStreet in violation because it had taken steps to
determine who the whistleblower was after receiving document requests from the SEC); BlueLinx
Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78528, 114 SEC Docket 4599, 2016 WL 4363864 (Aug.
10, 2016) (finding BlueLinx in violation by use of a non-disclosure agreement which forced
employees to either choose between identifying themselves to the company as whistleblowers or
potentially losing their severance pay and benefits); KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619,
111 SEC Docket 917, 2015 WL 1456619 (Apr. 1, 2015) (requiring KBR to amend its confidentiality
agreement so that it would not impede the purposes of the WP).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1).
44. See sources cited supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining “related actions”).
45. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-11 (2019) (detailing these procedures).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5(a) (2019).
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(II) the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower and any legal representative
of the whistleblower in a covered judicial or administrative action;
(III) the programmatic interest of the [SEC] in deterring violations of the securities laws
by making awards to whistleblowers who provide information that lead to the successful
enforcement of such laws; and
(IV) such additional relevant factors as the [SEC] may establish by rule or
regulation . . . .47

The SEC is statutorily forbidden from “tak[ing] into
consideration the balance of the [Investor Protection] Fund” (“IPF”)
when determining the size of a whistleblower award.48 The IPF was
created by the Dodd-Frank Act to fund SEC whistleblower awards, as
well as the SEC Inspector General’s suggestion program, and has three
replenishment sources.49 First, if its balance drops to $300 million, the
SEC must deposit into the IPF any monetary sanctions the SEC collects
that are not paid into a fund for victims under § 308 of the SarbanesOxley Act or otherwise distributed to victims (this money would
normally go to the United States Treasury).50 Second, if the balance
drops to $200 million, the SEC must also deposit into the IPF any
money in a section 308 fund that is not distributed to victims.51 And if
there is not enough money in the IPF to pay a whistleblower award, the
monetary sanction collected in the covered action on which the award
is based shall be deposited into the IPF to cover the shortfall.52
Rule 21F-6 further governs the SEC’s exercise of discretion when
determining whistleblower awards. The Rule lists factors that the SEC
may consider “in relation to the unique facts and circumstances of each
case,” and provides that the SEC “may increase or decrease the award
percentage based on its analysis of these factors.”53 In deciding whether
to increase the amount of a whistleblower’s award, the Rule requires
the SEC to consider the three factors enumerated in the Dodd-Frank

47. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(i).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(ii).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g)(1)–(2).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g)(3)(A)(i).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g)(3)(A)(ii).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g)(3)(B). The IPF is also entitled to keep income from investments made
with its funds. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g)(3)(A)(iii); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g)(4) (detailing the
investments that may be made with IPF funds). The first infusion of funds into the IPF occurred
in August 2010, when the SEC transferred to the fund the portion of a substantial monetary
sanction it received that was not designated for payment to investors. See OIG REPORT, supra note
9, at 26 (stating that in August 2010, “approximately $452 million of non-exchange
revenue . . . was transferred to the fund from the SEC’s disgorgement and penalties deposit fund”).
53. If the SEC makes awards to multiple claimants, it “will determine an individual
percentage award for each whistleblower, but in no event will the total amount awarded to all
whistleblowers in the aggregate be less than ten percent or greater than thirty percent of the
amount” collected. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5(c) (2019).
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Act—the significance of the information provided to the success of the
action,54 the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower,55
and the SEC’s “programmatic interest in deterring violations of the
securities laws”56—as well as a fourth: the extent to which the
whistleblower participated in an employer’s internal compliance
system.57 In deciding whether to decrease the amount of a
whistleblower’s award, the Rule requires the SEC to consider: (1) the
“culpability or involvement of the whistleblower in matters associated”
with the covered action or related action;58 (2) whether the
whistleblower unreasonably delayed in reporting the suspected
securities violations;59 and (3) “in cases where the whistleblower
interacted with his or her entity’s internal compliance or reporting
system, whether the whistleblower undermined the integrity of such
system.”60
For each plus and minus factor, Rule 21F-6 provides from two to
seven considerations that “the Commission may take into account,
among other things” in evaluating the factor.61 No weight is assigned to
these considerations or, for that matter, to the plus or minus factors
themselves. Instead, the stated criteria in Rule 21F-6 are merely
guidelines and do not create a rigid formula—“the determination of the
appropriate percentage of a whistleblower award will involve a highly
individualized review of the facts and circumstances surrounding each
award.”62 The full text of Rule 21F-6 is set forth in Appendix A.
B. Data on Awards Granted
From the inception of the WP to the close of the SEC’s 2018 fiscal
year, the SEC issued whistleblower awards to fifty-nine individuals
totaling over $326 million.63 The majority of the awards have been for
less than $2 million, and the vast majority have been for less than $5
million.64 But there have been a handful of substantially larger awards,

54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(1) (2019).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(2).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(3).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(1).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(2).
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(3).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6.
62. WP Release, supra note 10, at 34,331.
63. See WP 2018 REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.
64. Of the 59 individual award determinations as of the close of fiscal year 2018, fifty-two
included a disclosed estimated dollar amount. Of that subset, fifty-two percent (27) had estimated
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as demonstrated in Figure 1. The largest awards in the program’s
history were issued last year: in March 2018, $83 million was awarded
in a covered action, with two whistleblowers splitting a $50 million
award and a third receiving a $33 million award, and in September
2018, $54 million was awarded in a covered action, with one
whistleblower receiving a $39 million award and another a $15 million
award.65 Prior to these awards, the biggest dollar award was issued to
a single whistleblower in September 2014; it was estimated to pay out
between $30 and $35 million.66 After the close of fiscal year 2018, in
March 2019, $50 million was awarded in a covered action, with one
whistleblower receiving a $37 million award and another receiving a
$13 million award.67
Little can be gleaned about the SEC’s habits in setting award
percentages from the heavily redacted award determination orders that
are published on the SEC’s website or from the press releases that often
(but not always) accompany these orders.68 With rare exceptions, these
documents do not reveal information about the underlying offense that
gave rise to the covered action. They tend to include only a rote
recitation that the criteria in Rule 21F-6 were considered in setting the
percentage. And, at least in recent years, these documents almost
always omit the actual percentage awarded. According to my review,
early in the program’s history the SEC routinely disclosed the
percentage awarded, but since 2015, it has done so only once.69 By
award payouts of less than $2 million and seventy-three percent (38) had estimated award payouts
of less than $5 million.
65. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Its Largest-Ever
Whistleblower Awards (March 19, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-44
[https://perma.cc/8GCS-U797]; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Awards More Than
$54 Million to Two Whistleblowers (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018179 [https://perma.cc/S3NZ-VEHF].
66. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Largest-Ever
Whistleblower Award (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-206
[https://perma.cc/F2E5-UPZ9].
67. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Awards $50 Million to Two
Whistleblowers
(March
26,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-42
[https://perma.cc/6MDW-VT63].
68. In its annual report to Congress, the SEC provides in summary fashion some
characteristics of successful whistleblowers. See, e.g., WP 2018 REPORT, supra note 20, at 16−17.
The report does not, however, shed any light on the percentages awarded to whistleblowers or how
the SEC has applied the Rule 21F-6 criteria.
69. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Release No. 80115 (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2017/34-80115.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KZM-L6VZ]
(reporting
twenty percent award). This shift in practice coincides temporally with increasing average award
payouts in dollar terms. Based on my review of individual awards that include disclosed estimates
of payout amounts, from the program’s inception through 2015 the mean individual award was
approximately $3.4 million (median approximately $419,000). From 2016 to the close of fiscal year
2018, the mean individual award more than doubled to approximately $7.4 million (median
approximately $3.5 million).
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contrast, the SEC almost always announces the likely or actual dollar
amount of the award.70
C. Proposed Revisions to Rule 21F-6
Rule 21F-6, in its existing form, requires the SEC to determine
whistleblower awards using the percentage method without
considering the total dollars that the percentage awarded would yield
the whistleblower. So, in deciding that a twenty-five percent award is
appropriate based on the factors laid out in the rule, the SEC is required
to ignore that this would yield only $250,000 in a covered action with
$1 million in monetary sanctions collected or a whopping $125 million
in a covered action with $500 million in monetary sanctions collected.
The proposed amendments to Rule 21F-6 would change this, allowing
the SEC to consider dollar amounts in making award determinations,
but only at the margins.
The first proposed change to the Rule would liberate the SEC to
consider dollar amounts in cases involving very small awards.
Specifically, if the monetary award that would result from application
of the current criteria using the percentage method would lead to a
payout of less than $2 million (or any such greater amount that the SEC
may periodically establish), the SEC would have the authority to adjust
the award upward “to ensure that the total payout to the whistleblower
more appropriately achieves the program’s objectives of rewarding
meritorious whistleblowers and sufficiently incentivizing future
whistleblowers who might otherwise be concerned about the low dollar
amount of a potential award.”71 The SEC “anticipate[s] that . . . there
would be a presumption in favor of some award enhancement, though
the precise amount of the enhancement may vary from case to case
depending on the unique facts and circumstances at issue.”72 Such
upward modification is barred, however, if any of the current criteria
for a downward adjustment apply or if the whistleblower was culpably
involved in the misconduct giving rise to the covered action.73 In
addition, any upward adjustment cannot raise the whistleblower’s

70. Thirty-nine individual awards have been announced since 2016. With respect to all but
one, see id., the SEC disclosed the estimated dollar payout of the award but omitted the percentage
of collected sanctions awarded.
71. Whistleblower Program Rules, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,702, 34,748 (July 20, 2018) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
72. Id. at 34,712.
73. Id. at 34,748.
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payout above $2 million, nor may it cause the total amount awarded to
all whistleblowers in the covered action to exceed thirty percent.74
The second proposed change to Rule 21F-6 would require the
SEC to consider dollar amounts in certain cases involving potentially
very large awards. If a whistleblower’s original information led to one
or more successful covered or related actions that, collectively, resulted
in or will likely result in the collection of $100 million or more in
monetary sanctions (or any such higher amount that the SEC may
periodically establish), the proposed amendments provide the SEC with
additional instructions for fashioning the appropriate percentage.75
First, in considering the existing Rule 21F-6 criteria for upward and
downward adjustments, the SEC would be required to “consider[ ] the
impact of the adjustments on both the award percentage and the
approximate corresponding dollar amount of the award.”76 Second, if
the payout determined after applying those criteria is $30 million or
higher, the proposed amendments would require the SEC to “consider
whether that amount exceeds what is reasonably necessary to reward
the
whistleblower
and
to
incentivize
similarly
situated
whistleblowers.”77 If it finds that it is, the Commission is instructed to
“adjust the total payout . . . downward to an amount that it finds is
sufficient to achieve those goals.”78 In no event, however, may the
downward adjustment
yield a potential award payout (as assessed by the [SEC] at the time that it makes the
award determination) below $30 million, nor may any downward adjustment result in the
total amount awarded to all meritorious whistleblowers, collectively, for each covered or
related action, [falling below] 10 percent of the monetary sanctions collected in that
action.79

In defense of this amendment to Rule 21F-6, the proposing
release explains “there is a potential that as the payout to a
whistleblower grows beyond the $30 million floor, the marginal benefit
74. Id.
75. Id. at 34,748–79.
76. Id. at 34,749 (emphasis added).
77. Id. In “determining whether a payout exceeds what is appropriate to achieve the
program’s objectives, the [SEC] would carefully assess the potential payout in relation to both any
unusually detrimental circumstances that impact the whistleblower and the level of financial
incentive that may be necessary to encourage future similarly situated whistleblowers to come
forward.” Id. at 34,715; see also id. at 34,715−16 (giving examples of unusually detrimental
circumstances and financial incentive considerations).
78. Id. at 34,749.
79. Id. at 34,714. With respect to the amount of any downward adjustment, the proposing
release imagines “a sliding scale that corresponds with the overall size of the potential award in
dollar terms.” Id. at 34,716. “In our view, this sliding-scale approach would make sense because
the larger the dollar amount of a payout away from the $30 million floor, the greater the likelihood
of diminishing marginal benefits to the program from each additional dollar paid to the
whistleblower.” Id.
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of each additional dollar paid may decrease to such an extent that, in
terms of furthering the program’s overall goals, the payout may be more
than is reasonably necessary.”80 The proposing release also points to the
preservation of the IPF as a basis for the amendment. The release
explains that large awards “could substantially diminish the IPF,
requiring the [SEC] to direct more funds to replenish the IPF rather
than making that money available to the United States Treasury,
where they could be used for other important public purposes.”81 The
amendment “would help ensure that the [IPF] that Congress has
established to pay meritorious whistleblowers is used in a manner that
effectively and appropriately leverages the IPF to further the
Commission’s law enforcement objectives.”82
If past is prologue, the package of amendments to Rule 21F-6
would benefit a greater number of whistleblowers than they would
disadvantage, given that there have been many more awards of less
than $2 million than there have been awards of $30 million or more (by
a margin of nine to one).83 But critics contend that the SEC should only
be allowed to consider dollar amounts as a basis for increasing awards
of less than $2 million, not decreasing those in excess of $30 million.
This reflects a preference for higher whistleblower awards in general,
and also more certain ones, in order to give whistleblowers strong
incentives to come forward despite the risks they may face. SEC
Commissioner Robert Jackson, for example, has argued that allowing
the SEC to deviate from the percentage method to reduce very large
awards could deter risk-averse whistleblowers from coming forward by
making award amounts less predictable.84 Former SEC Commissioner
Kara Stein has also expressed concern that allowing the SEC to deviate
from the percentage method to reduce a large award could be “used as
a means to weaken the Whistleblower Program.”85 The National

80. Id. at 34,714. In the SEC’s judgment, “$30 million represents a reasonable line at which
to draw the floor.” Id. The release supports this judgment by pointing out that an individual who
received $30 million, even after taxes, would “find himself or herself in the range of the top 99.5
percentile to 99.9 percentile of the U.S. population by net worth” and, if invested modestly, could
produce “a reasonable lifetime income stream for most potential whistleblowers.” Id. at 34,715.
81. Id. at 34,704.
82. Id. The large whistleblower awards issued in March 2018 caused the balance of the IPF
to drop below the $300 million threshold that triggers the statutory replenishment mechanism for
the first time since the IPF’s initial funding. Id. at 34,704, 37,715.
83. Based on my review of awards with estimated payouts disclosed as of the end of FY2018,
the SEC has granted 27 individual awards estimated to payout less than $2 million and 3
individual awards estimated to payout $30 million or more.
84. Jackson, supra note 8.
85. Stein, supra note 8.
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Whistleblower Legal Defense & Education Fund has also spoken out
against this proposed amendment.86
III. A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO AWARD CALCULATION
Lurking behind the debate over the desirability of the proposed
amendments to Rule 21F-6 is a more fundamental question: Why
should the percentage method be the primary method for determining
SEC whistleblower awards anyway, as opposed to some other
methodology? Only once we understand the function the percentage
method serves can we intelligently assess whether the SEC’s proposed
rule revisions are desirable.
A. The Purpose of Whistleblower Awards
We must begin with the purpose of whistleblower awards.
Competing methodologies for computing awards must, after all, be
evaluated based on how well they further that purpose. This Article
assumes that the purpose of whistleblower awards is to incentivize
individuals to submit tips to the SEC, with the ultimate goal of more
efficiently deterring securities law violations. That the award program
is meant to incentivize whistleblowers is supported by the very title of
the statutory provision giving birth to it (“Securities Whistleblower
Incentives and Protection”),87 is consistent with the manner in which
the SEC has framed and discussed whistleblower awards,88 and is the

86. Proposed SEC Rule Will Hurt Whistleblower Program, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER LEGAL
DEF. & EDUC. FUND (July 5, 2018), https://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2018/07/articles/doddfrank-whistleblowers/proposed-sec-whistleblower-rule/ [https://perma.cc/DW4A-5FCP].
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012) (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec .& Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues $4 Million Whistleblower
Award
(Sept.
20,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-188.html
[https://perma.cc/KY96-4Q97] (quoting Jane Norberg, Acting Chief of the SEC’s Office of the
Whistleblower, as stating that the WP “continues to incentivize whistleblowers to come forward
with solid information that helps us bring violators to justice before more wrongdoing can occur”);
Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Incentivizing
Whistleblowers
to
Bring
Fraud
to
Light
(May
25,
2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511laa-item2.htm [https://perma.cc/JD6S-DC28]
(stating that the “goal of the whistleblower program is to create a system that incentivizes
individuals to come forward with high quality information to help the Commission expose fraud”);
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Chairman: Opening
Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Item 2 — Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511mls-item2.htm [https://perma.cc/J7Q3-PVEC]
(explaining that the rules governing the WP were drafted to “incentivize those close to a fraud to
come forward and provide information to the Commission”).
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most logical basis for the government to provide financial awards to
whistleblowers.89
More precisely, I assume that the promise of a whistleblower
award is designed to alter the internal cost-benefit calculation a
potential whistleblower engages in when deciding whether to report
wrongdoing or remain silent. If we assume that whistleblowers are
rational actors, they will not submit a tip if the expected gains from
doing so do not exceed the expected losses. The costs of blowing the
whistle can be significant, including psychic discomfort, potential
workplace retaliation, and industry blacklisting.90 The Dodd-Frank Act
seeks to reduce these costs through the promise of confidentiality and
retaliation protection but cannot eliminate them entirely. The benefits
of blowing the whistle naturally include any gratification that comes
from doing the right thing as well as the possible avoidance of
complicity in wrongdoing and resulting liability exposure. The DoddFrank Act seeks to increase the benefits of reporting by adding a
potential financial award to the list.91
A rational actor, in deciding whether the prospect of a
whistleblower award tips the scales in favor of reporting, would
calculate the expected value of that award (the product of the award’s
anticipated magnitude and probability). Next, she would discount the
expected value to reflect both the time value of money (whistleblower
awards can take years to receive92) and risk (assuming she is risk

89. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 579 (2004)
(discussing the utilitarian function of state-paid rewards for reporting law violations). One might
counter that whistleblowers deserve financial awards for their bravery in stepping forward; but
there is no evidence that Congress meant to empower bureaucrats at the SEC to pay
whistleblowers based on notions of moral desert, divorced from the incentive effects such awards
would have on whistleblowers going forward. Another equally implausible notion is that a
whistleblower has some sort of property right in the monetary recovery her tip helped to produce.
Simply being aware of misconduct does not entitle one to a stake in the penalties or disgorgement
the perpetrator of that misconduct may owe as a result, even if one incurred costs to learn of the
information; turning that information over to the government does not magically create such a
property interest. To be sure, the holder of the information in a sense “owns” the information that
she acquired and, if not otherwise compelled by law, need not turn it over to government
authorities. She will presumably do so only if she perceives it to be in her best interest. This, of
course, takes us back to the incentive rationale for whistleblower awards.
90. See MARCIA P. MICELI ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWING IN ORGANIZATIONS 101–30 (2008)
(surveying studies on whistleblower retaliation).
91. With respect to some sorts of misconduct, the introduction of financial benefits for
reporting may operate to reduce the perceived psychic benefits from doing so, potentially resulting
in less whistleblowing activity. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The
Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality,
88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1202 (2010). This phenomenon is unlikely to occur in the context of SEC
whistleblowing, however. See Rose, supra note 14, at 1275–77 (explaining why).
92. Frustration over the delay recently led a whistleblower to initiate litigation against the
SEC. See Rachel Graf, SEC Must Decide on Teva Whistleblower Award, D.C. Circ. Told, LAW360
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averse). The riskiness of an expected award is in part a function of the
probability it will materialize (the tip might not produce a covered
action or the SEC might find the whistleblower ineligible for an award).
It is also a function of the certainty of the assumptions that underlie
the calculation of the expected award. To calculate an expected award,
a potential whistleblower must estimate several variables: the
likelihood that a covered action will result from her tip, the likelihood
that she will be determined eligible for an award, the likely amount of
an eventual award, and the likelihood she will have to share it with
others. The more uncertain the estimation of these variables, the more
a risk-averse potential whistleblower will discount the expected value
of the anticipated award when deciding whether blowing the whistle is
worth the costs.
This is not to suggest that potential whistleblowers will actually
sit down and do the math before deciding whether to come forward. But
it is realistic to expect that they will consider, at a gut level at least, the
harm that may come to them by reporting and compare it to the likely
benefits. It is also realistic to expect that individuals who would be
unwilling to come forward in the absence of the whistleblower award
program—those whose minds the program seeks to change—will think
about how big of an award they might get if they report, how likely the
award is, how long they would have to wait for it, and how much risk
they are willing to bear. They may not quantify the variables expressly
and feed them into a formula, but they can be expected to consider them
intuitively in reaching a decision.93
The SEC’s Whistleblower Program seeks to encourage a greater
number of tips by changing individuals’ internal cost-benefit calculation
as discussed above. But encouraging a greater number of tips is not an
end in itself. Rather, it is designed to aid the SEC in its enforcement
mission, which this Article assumes to be the deterrence of securities
law violations. To be justified, a deterrence-focused enforcement regime
must save more in social costs from deterred securities law violations
than it produces in enforcement costs; an optimal deterrence regime
(May
1,
2019,
8:47
PM),
https://www.law360.com/securities/articles/1154926
[https://perma.cc/M376-EABP].
93. An SEC choice not to pursue a tip eliminates any probability of an award, and it also
might lessen the probability that a tipster will be discovered and therefore experience costs such
as workplace retaliation or industry blacklisting. The cost side of the whistleblower’s cost-benefit
equation, in other words, could be dependent on a factor that is related to the probability of an
award and hence the award’s expected value. This would call for an even more sophisticated
analysis than the one imagined in the text, and it is not realistic to expect even counseled
whistleblowers to know how to model conditional expectations the way a mathematician would.
That said, whistleblowers could very well appreciate that in the event their tip were not pursued,
they would experience fewer costs, and this might lead them to find tipping worthwhile in more
scenarios than the discussion above suggests.
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would minimize the sum of these costs. Whistleblower awards can work
to reduce both variables. Private individuals often possess information
about securities law violations that would be costly for the SEC to
discover on its own; encouraging whistleblower tips can therefore help
the SEC save on investigative costs it otherwise would have incurred.
The lure of an award can also deter a greater number of violations than
would otherwise be possible by increasing the likelihood that securities
law violators will be caught. An individual contemplating a securities
law violation would weigh the benefits of committing the violation
against the costs of being caught, discounted by the likelihood of being
caught. If the whistleblower program increases the likelihood of being
caught, individuals will therefore find fewer violations worthwhile.
Betterment of the SEC’s enforcement regime is not, however, the
inevitable consequence of a whistleblower award program because the
program itself creates costs. These include the cost of sorting through
tips to determine which are worthy of pursuit, the cost of mistakenly
pursuing tips that turn out not to be fruitful, as well as the cost of the
award payments themselves—money that could be put to other socially
valuable uses if not paid out to whistleblowers. To the extent the
program encourages individuals to bypass or undermine a company’s
internal compliance system (often the most direct and effective way to
identify and halt violations), that too produces costs that need to be
taken into account. Depending on the nature and quantity of the tips
elicited and the amounts paid out in awards, these costs could outweigh
the benefits of the program.94
Whistleblower award programs like the SEC’s therefore face a
challenge: they need to encourage whistleblowers with desirable tips to
come forward (namely, those that create more benefits than costs and
thus push the SEC closer to its goal of optimal deterrence) without
simultaneously encouraging the submission of undesirable tips (that is,
those that create net costs and thus undermine the SEC’s deterrence
objective).95 Even if the SEC could costlessly identify and weed out tips
94. Weak tips could also have a deleterious ex ante effect on the behavior of would-be
securities law violators. For example, if weak tips lead to erroneous liability, it could weaken
market participants’ incentive to comply with the law by decreasing the expected benefit of
compliance relative to violation. See Yehonatan Givati, A Theory of Whistleblower Rewards, 45 J.
LEGAL STUD. 43, 45 (2016). Weak tips could also embolden would-be securities law violators by
decreasing the probability of detection, if the SEC diverts resources that would otherwise be spent
detecting misconduct to sorting through tips. Cf. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise
Reduction: The Screening Value of Qui Tam, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1190–92 (2014).
95. Professor David Engstrom refers to this as the “Goldilocks Challenge.” David Freeman
Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of
Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 605, 613 (2014); see also Casey & Niblett, supra
note 94 at 1196; Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics
and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1171–72 (1999).
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that are not worthy of pursuit, the program should strive to avoid award
payouts that exceed what is necessary to achieve the desired incentives,
given that those funds could be put to higher-valued social use.
It is difficult to define with greater precision which tips are
“desirable” and which are not. Tip desirability is a continuum, and
where along that continuum tips become more burdensome than helpful
to the SEC will be a function, in part, of how efficiently the SEC can
sort through tips and identify which are worthy of pursuit. It will also
be a function of both the strength of the suspicion that underlies the tip
and the nature of the misconduct the tip relates to. Oftentimes,
whistleblowers are not certain that a securities law violation has
occurred; instead, they suspect with a particular level of probability
that a violation has occurred based on incomplete information.96 All else
equal, tips based on higher-probability suspicions are more likely to
produce deterrence benefits and less likely to produce wasted costs than
tips based on relatively lower-probability suspicions, given that they
are more likely to lead to the discovery of a securities law violation as
opposed to innocent conduct. Tips that concern relatively more serious
misconduct, again all else equal, are also more likely to lead to net
deterrence benefits than those that concern relatively less serious
misconduct, given that the social costs of the violations deterred as a
result of such tips will be greater. Because the desirability of a tip is a
function of both the probability it will unearth a violation and the level
of social harm caused by the suspected violation, a relatively higherprobability tip concerning a relatively less serious violation might have
the same desirability as a relatively lower-probability tip concerning a
relatively more serious violation.
The SEC’s covered action requirement operates to create
differential incentives for individuals to report depending on tip
desirability, thus understood. Recall that in order to be eligible for a
whistleblower award, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that the tip lead to
a “covered action,” which means an SEC enforcement action resulting
in the imposition of at least $1 million in monetary penalties. This
requirement discourages tips related to suspected misconduct that is
not serious enough to warrant this level of punishment. Presumably,
Congress believed that encouraging such tips would not produce
sufficient deterrence benefits to outweigh the costs—that is, that such
tips would be “undesirable.”
The covered action requirement may also create differential
incentives to report depending on how serious the suspected misconduct
96. Tips that are knowingly false are discouraged by the covered action requirement and by
the requirement that tips be submitted under penalty of perjury.
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is, even when that misconduct would warrant at least $1 million in
monetary penalties. To see this, recall that a rational actor would
calculate the expected value of a potential whistleblower award by
multiplying its anticipated magnitude by its probability. To the extent
that the SEC is more likely to pursue a case involving more serious
misconduct, whistleblowers who suspect more serious misconduct will
view a covered action as more probable than those who suspect less
serious misconduct; thus, all else equal, they will be more likely to come
forward because awards will have a higher expected value to them.
The covered action requirement likewise creates stronger
incentives for individuals with higher-probability suspicions to come
forward. This is because individuals with stronger suspicions will also
view a covered action as more likely to result from their tip than
potential whistleblowers with weaker suspicions. Thus, all else equal,
potential awards will have a higher expected value in their eyes.
While the covered action requirement creates differential
incentives to report based on tip desirability, it does not ensure that the
whistleblower program will succeed in encouraging desirable tips
without also encouraging undesirable tips. That will ultimately depend
on the expected costs of whistleblowing relative to the amount of
expected awards, and the latter depends not just on the award’s
probability but also on its anticipated magnitude. An award’s
magnitude will depend, of course, on the award calculation
methodology.
Take an extreme but illustrative example: if every eligible
whistleblower received an award of $1 billion and typical
whistleblowing costs were $100, individuals with extremely low
probability suspicions relating to even minor offenses would be
encouraged to report, so long as the offense could conceivably warrant
the imposition of at least $1 million in sanctions. The deluge of tips
would predictably move the SEC further from, not closer to, its goal of
optimal deterrence by producing more in costs than deterrence
benefits.97 Moreover, even if the SEC could costlessly identify and weed
out those tips not worthy of pursuit, it would end up spending much
97. Even risk-averse individuals with low-probability tips would find it rational to come
forward in this scenario, but the promise of this sort of jackpot might operate to change people’s
risk preferences. Individuals are often willing to make low cost wagers on small probability events
with high payoffs, even when the expected payoff is less than the cost of the bet—thus displaying
risk-seeking behavior. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see also Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel,
Gamblers Favor Skewness, Not Risk: Further Evidence from United States’ Lottery Games, 63
ECON. LETTERS 85 (1999). Extremely large whistleblower awards relative to whistleblowing costs
might trigger this “lottery mentality,” leading to an even larger deluge of low probability tips than
would be expected under our working assumption that whistleblowers are risk averse.
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more in award payouts than would be necessary to incentivize
whistleblowers, thus wasting money that could be put to higher-valued
social use. Conversely, if typical whistleblowing costs were $1 billion
and every whistleblower entitled to an award received only $100, the
program would not encourage anyone to come forward, including
individuals with strong suspicions about misconduct that imposes
significant costs on society.
*

*

*

The foregoing suggests some important factors to keep in mind
when evaluating a whistleblower award calculation methodology. Most
importantly, such a methodology should strive to produce award
amounts that, on a discounted expected value basis, exceed the costs
potential whistleblowers with desirable but not undesirable tips expect
to bear. Even if the SEC could costlessly sort through tips, award
amounts should not be set arbitrarily high because the funds in excess
of what is needed to achieve the program’s goals could be redeployed to
more socially productive uses. This does not mean that the SEC should
strive to set award amounts with complete precision, such that not one
extra dollar is spent above what is necessary to create the right
incentives for whistleblowers to report. Just as undesirable tips produce
costs that detract from the efficiency gains of a whistleblower program,
so too does the program’s administration; thus, the costs associated
with implementing an award calculation methodology is a factor to be
considered. Finally, the ease of predicting award amounts using the
methodology is also important. The higher the level of certainty with
which a potential whistleblower can estimate an expected award, the
smaller the risk discount they can be expected to apply, and hence the
smaller the award needs to be to achieve the same incentive effect.
B. Evaluating the Percentage Method
Let us now evaluate the methodology currently used to calculate
SEC whistleblower awards. As explained above, today such awards
must be set at an amount not less than ten and not more than thirty
percent of the monetary penalties collected in a covered action and any
related actions, with adjustments between those extremes done on a
percentage basis in light of the criteria set forth in Rule 21F-6.
One virtue of this methodology is that it is fairly simple to
administer. Determining the ten percent minimum and thirty percent
maximum award value requires a straightforward and elementary
calculation. Determining where within this broad range the actual
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percentage awarded should fall requires SEC deliberation of the factors
laid out in Rule 21F-6, but the SEC will be in possession of the facts
necessary to assess each factor without the need for significant
additional investigation. It can also weigh the factors however it
chooses, without the risk of judicial second-guessing.
Another virtue of the percentage method is that it, like the
covered action requirement, creates differential incentives for
whistleblowers to come forward based on tip desirability. Whereas the
covered action requirement achieves this through its impact on the
probability of an award, the percentage method achieves this through
its impact on award magnitude. To see this, consider first the DoddFrank Act requirement that awards equal between ten and thirty
percent of monetary penalties collected. The penalty imposed on a
defendant should be correlated to the seriousness of the violation being
punished. All else equal, tying whistleblower awards to penalties
imposed should therefore create stronger incentives for whistleblowers
to come forward the more serious the misconduct suspected: expected
awards will be higher and therefore more likely, when combined with
any other benefits of reporting, to outweigh expected whistleblowing
costs.98
But to explain this logic is to reveal an important shortcoming
of the percentage method as currently applied. The percentage method
does not award whistleblowers a percentage of the value of the penalties
imposed. It awards whistleblowers a percentage of the monetary
penalties imposed that are subsequently collected. A correlation
between this figure and the severity of the misconduct will likely exist,
98. I assume that whistleblower costs and the severity of the misconduct are exogenous to
one another. If whistleblower costs rose in scale with the severity of the misconduct, the percentage
method would not have the sorting effect described in the text. The relationship between
whistleblower costs and the severity of the misconduct to which a tip relates is not easy to discern.
The costs whistleblowers sometimes incur as a result of lost future employment opportunities
might bear an inverse relationship to the severity of the misconduct. One might imagine that a
whistleblower is less—not more—likely to be punished by potential future employers if it is known
that the tip the whistleblower provided involved a severe securities law violation as opposed to a
more technical violation that carries with it less social opprobrium. We tend, after all, to call
individuals who report zoning infractions “snitches” and those who help identify murderers
“heroes.” For similar reasons, reporting on severe violations might produce less internal angst
than reporting on other types of violations, meaning psychic costs may also bear an inverse
relationship to the severity of the misconduct. There is a positive association, consistently observed
in the empirical literature on whistleblowing, between the seriousness or magnitude of the
wrongdoing and the level of whistleblowing activity, MICELI ET AL., supra note 90, at 78; this is
consistent with the idea that whistleblowing costs tend to be lower, rather than higher, when the
wrongdoing is serious. But workplace retaliation, which itself can result in significant emotional
harm, might be more likely the more severe the misconduct. Social scientists have theorized that
the seriousness of the wrongdoing is one of several factors that may help predict workplace
retaliation, a proposition that finds some (albeit less than universal) support in empirical studies.
Id. at 101–30.
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but it will be weaker than the correlation between the value of
punishment imposed and the severity of the misconduct. How much the
SEC collects in monetary penalties is, after all, not just a function of the
size of the monetary penalty it chooses to impose, it is also a function of
the defendant’s ability to pay. (Even the SEC cannot squeeze blood out
of a turnip.) The monetary penalties collected in an enforcement action
against an individual, for example, will typically be substantially more
limited than the monetary penalties collected in an enforcement action
against a public company because of disparate solvency constraints.
The SEC may impose severe nonmonetary penalties on defendants as a
supplement to, or substitute for, monetary penalties, such as officer and
director bars, referral to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution, structural reforms, as well as other forms of injunctive
relief.99 Although the SEC often stresses that nonmonetary remedies
are critically important to its deterrence mission,100 nonmonetary relief
is given no value in setting the Dodd-Frank Act’s ten and thirty percent
award boundaries.
By tying awards to money collected instead of the value of
punishment imposed, the percentage method may bias the tip pool in a
problematic way. Many commentators believe that the SEC should fine
public companies less and pursue individual wrongdoers more.101 Cases
99. See DIV. OF ENF’T, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 12–13 (2018),
https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6D9C-8CLC]
[hereinafter SEC 2018 ENFORCEMENT REPORT] (discussing non-monetary remedies).
100. See, e.g., id. at 13 (“One of the most important things that the Commission can do to
protect investors is to remove bad actors from positions where they can engage in future
wrongdoing.”). The co-director of the SEC’s enforcement division recently remarked:
[T]he Commission has at its disposal a wide variety of remedies and relief. And in the
Division of Enforcement we think carefully about what of those tools to recommend to
the Commission in every case. What we do not do is assess large penalties simply for
the sake of counting them up at the end of the year. For that reason, the effectiveness
of our program cannot be measured with resort to any one quantitative measure, but
instead requires a nuanced and qualitative evaluation of our overall impact on
achieving our investor and market integrity protection mission.
Steven Peikin, Co-Director, Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remedies and Relief in SEC
Enforcement Actions, SEC (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peikin-100318
[https://perma.cc/R6JV-4A2G]. See also Stephanie Avakian, Co-Director, Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Measuring the Impact of the SEC’s Enforcement Program (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-avakian-092018
[https://perma.cc/MUF3-CNGA]
(arguing that statistics such as the dollar amount of judgements do not “provide a full and
meaningful picture of the quality, nature, and effectiveness of the [Division of Enforcement’s]
efforts”).
101. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 651–52 (2010) (critiquing the “SEC’s
tendency to resist prosecuting corporate executives and instead to pursue prompt settlements
against corporate defendants”); James A. Kaplan, Why Corporate Fraud Is on the Rise, FORBES
(June 10, 2010, 6:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2010/06/10/corporate-fraud-executivecompensation-personal-finance-risk-list-2-10-kaplan.html#7c6164e83aeb [https://perma.cc/3URT-
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against individual defendants, while recovering smaller dollar
amounts, can have a far greater deterrence impact than cases against
corporate defendants. Individual defendants are more likely to pay out
of their own pocket, and they also face severe nonmonetary penalties.
Pursuing individuals is harder than pursuing public companies,
however—the agents that control the latter are often willing to settle
and let the company’s shareholders or insurance company bear the cost,
whereas individuals facing real personal consequences are more likely
to fight charges, requiring the SEC to bear its burden of proof.102 It is
thus precisely with respect to these cases that whistleblower tips could
be most impactful, by helping the SEC discover the evidence of personal
misconduct that it will need to prevail. But if potential whistleblowers
expect that their tip will provoke the SEC to pursue individual
defendants rather than a deep-pocketed corporate defendant, they will
be less likely to blow the whistle than if the opposite were true. The
percentage methodology in this way sends a questionable signal to
potential whistleblowers. It also reinforces any natural tendency the
SEC has to favor suits against public companies because they are easier
to resolve.103
The criteria that Rule 21F-6 instructs the SEC to consider in
setting the actual award percentage within the broad ten to thirty
percent range also potentially operate to create differential incentives
to report depending on tip desirability. These factors instruct, inter alia,
that the more specific the information, the more important the tip in
QZYH] (arguing that the SEC should hold corporate executives and directors more accountable in
order to deter corporate fraud); Zachary Kouwe, Judge Rejects Settlement Over Merrill Bonuses,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2009), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/judge-rejects-settlementover-merrill-bonuses/ [https://perma.cc/9FG7-UM3D] (noting the “long-standing criticism that the
SEC has largely failed to prosecute cases against corporate executives, opting for quick settlements
in which companies themselves are penalized instead of their leaders”); Gretchen Morgenson,
Fining Bankers, Not Shareholders, for Banks’ Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/business/fining-bankers-not-shareholders-for-banksmisconduct.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/X76M-2CT9] (arguing that fines levied on banking firms
rather than executives have been ineffective).
102. See SEC 2018 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 99, at 14 (“individuals are more likely
to litigate and the ensuing litigation is resource intensive”); Macey, supra note 101, at 646.
103. Both the False Claims Act and the IRS Whistleblower Program tie awards to monetary
penalties collected. See discussion supra note 10 and accompanying text. But revenue-generation
is an important goal in both of those contexts. False Claims Act suits seek to recover money that
the federal government has wrongly been forced to pay out and IRS enforcement seeks to recover
wrongly withheld tax revenue; favoring tips that promise to lead to the recovery of the most money
for the federal government is thus sensible policy. The SEC’s enforcement mission, by contrast, is
not revenue-generation: it is to optimally deter securities law violations with the ultimate goal of
protecting investors and our capital markets. This mission is not necessarily advanced by favoring
tips that promise to lead to the highest collection of monetary penalties. Cf. Ferziger & Currell,
supra note 95, at 1182–83 (observing similarly that agencies that are not primarily revenueseeking, such as the Customs Service, should not condition whistleblower bounty payments on
monetary penalties collected).
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relation to the SEC’s “programmatic interest in deterrence,” and the
more timely the tip, the larger the award percentage a whistleblower
can expect. The whistleblower’s participation in, or undermining of, the
employer’s internal compliance system is also a factor the SEC is
instructed by the rule to consider in setting the award percentage.
These factors reward tips that are more likely to produce net deterrence
benefits.
The actual work the Rule 21F-6 criteria do to differentially
incentivize desirable tips is questionable, however. Rule 21F-6 does not
require that the SEC assign any particular weight to any particular
factor, and its discretion to award percentages within the ten to thirty
percent statutory range is judicially unreviewable. In its public award
determination orders, the SEC has been very opaque about the effect it
has given to the Rule 21F-6 criteria. Indeed, most of the time the SEC
does not even publish the percentage awarded.104 This makes it difficult
for potential whistleblowers to estimate their likely award percentage
with any confidence, complicating the already difficult task of deciding
whether tipping is worthwhile. Potential whistleblowers might
conservatively assume that they will obtain the ten percent minimum
award, or else account for the uncertainty surrounding a higher
anticipated percentage by steeply discounting the expected award.
Whistleblowers who retain counsel with experience representing
successful claimants may be able to guess at a likely award percentage
with greater confidence, but of course legal representation comes at a
cost. The consequence is that potential whistleblowers will be more
likely to find that the personal costs of coming forward exceed the
benefits than would be the case if the SEC were more transparent about
how it sets award percentages.
This points up another important weakness of the percentage
method, both as adopted in the Dodd-Frank Act and as carried forward
in Rule 21F-6. While the percentage method creates differential
incentives to report based on tip desirability, it—like the covered action
requirement—is essentially blind to whistleblowers’ actual costs.105 If
the penalties imposed in a covered action reflect its deterrence value,
104. See discussion supra note 70 and accompanying text.
105. Whistleblower costs are not obviously correlated with the monetary penalties collected in
a covered action (see discussion supra note 98 and accompanying text), nor are they a factor that
the SEC is required to consider in setting the award percentage. Rule 21F-6 lists “[a]ny unique
hardships experienced by the whistleblower as a result of his or her reporting and assisting in the
enforcement action“ as one of six sub-factors that the SEC has the option to consider as part of its
analysis of the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower—itself one of seven plus/minus
factors that the SEC may weigh however it likes in determining the award percentage. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.21F-6(a)(2)(vi) (2019). This is the only reference to whistleblower costs in the entirety of Rule
21F-6.
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then capping whistleblower awards at a fraction of monetary penalties
collected ensures that an award will not exceed the deterrence value of
the tip (ignoring enforcement and administrative costs). But the
percentage method does not ensure that awards will not vastly exceed
what is necessary to incentivize whistleblowers to come forward. Nor
does it ensure that awards will not be so high as to encourage
undesirable tips or, conversely, that they will be high enough so as to
encourage desirable tips. This will all depend on the actual costs
whistleblowers expect to bear by coming forward, which again the SEC
does not currently take into consideration when setting award
amounts.106
One could imagine an alternative award calculation
methodology keyed to whistleblower costs rather than the penalty
imposed. For example, whistleblowers whose tips resulted in a covered
action could be guaranteed a set multiple of any costs they incurred
from coming forward, with the multiple set to reflect the minimum
probability of success the SEC wants the tips elicited to possess in the
eyes of whistleblowers, with a kicker to offset risk aversion.107 The SEC
106. Cf. Robert Howse & Ronald J. Daniels, Rewarding Whistleblowers: The Costs and Benefits
of an Incentive-Based Compliance Strategy, in CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA 525, 536
(Ronald J. Daniels & Randall Mork eds., 1995) (“[I]t is clear that using a percentage of the fines
ultimately levied against the corporation as a basis for bounties paid to whistleblowers may cause
payments to diverge systematically from the levels necessary to compensate whistleblowers for
the risk of loss to their human capital from corporate retaliation.”).
107. This cost-based methodology can be derived from a simple set of assumptions. First,
potential whistleblowers will not report to the SEC if the expected benefits from doing so do not
exceed the expected costs. Assume that a whistleblower award is the only benefit a whistleblower
expects to receive from reporting and, for simplicity, ignore the time value of money and assume
that whistleblowers expect to incur the same costs whether or not their tip results in a covered
action. Under these circumstances, a potential whistleblower would not report unless the
anticipated award payment, multiplied by its probability, exceeded the expected value of the
whistleblower’s costs. This condition can be expressed algebraically as A*PA > C, where A denotes
the anticipated award payment, PA denotes the probability of the award, and C denotes the
expected value of whistleblowing costs. Rearranged, this condition reveals that whistleblowers
must anticipate an award that exceeds the expected value of their costs divided by the probability
of an award: A > C/PA. In other words, if a whistleblower has a ten percent probability of
recovering an award, the anticipated award magnitude must exceed ten times the expected value
of the whistleblower’s costs for tipping to be potentially worthwhile. And if a whistleblower has a
one percent probability of recovering an award, the anticipated award magnitude would need to
be one hundred times higher than the expected value of the whistleblowers’ costs to make tipping
potentially sensible. If whistleblowers were risk neutral rational actors, the award amounts would
need to exceed these figures by just a penny to induce reporting; in reality, they would need to be
adjusted upward by an amount sufficient to offset the discount potential whistleblowers would
apply as a result of risk aversion. Now, observe that the SEC could—and indeed should—decide
the minimum probability of success it wants the tips the whistleblower program elicits to possess
in the eyes of potential whistleblowers. Recall that if the program encourages too many
undesirable tips, it can undermine the value of the program; the SEC is best positioned to figure
out where to draw the line. Observe also that SEC is capable of identifying the award enhancement
it thinks is necessary to offset risk aversion on the part of whistleblowers with tips of the desired
strength. If the SEC made these determinations via rulemaking, in particular cases it could then

Rose_PAGE

2074

11/16/2019 6:29 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:6:2047

could encourage tips with lower probabilities of success if they relate to
more severe misconduct by applying different multipliers in cases
involving different types of allegations (for example, a higher multiple
could be promised to whistleblowers whose tips lead to the discovery of
a scienter-based offense).
If implemented well, a cost-based method would more reliably
incentivize reporting than does the percentage method. But it would be
administratively more burdensome to apply and, importantly, it would
encourage reporting even if the award payout would exceed the
deterrence benefits produced by the tip. Just as the percentage method
is disconnected from whistleblowing costs, the cost-based method is
disconnected from the actual deterrence benefits achieved as a result of
the tip. What is needed is a hybrid approach that takes both the
deterrence value of the tip and whistleblower costs into account.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM
The proposed revisions to Rule 21F-6 move precisely in this
direction. The proposed revisions would allow the SEC, at least in a
subset of cases, to consider the dollar amount of an award in order to
determine whether the whistleblower award would be too small, or
larger than necessary to reward the whistleblower and incentivize
desirable tips in the future, and to adjust the award upward or
downward if it so finds (within the statutory bounds). This would invite
the SEC to focus on whistleblower costs, which are essentially ignored
under the current methodology, within a percentage framework that is
tied (albeit imperfectly) to the deterrence benefit produced by the tip.
Such a hybrid approach is attractive from a theoretical perspective for
the reasons outlined above.108
calculate whistleblower awards by calculating the costs the whistleblower incurred by coming
forward, dividing it by the chosen probability of tip success, and multiplying the quotient by the
rate of enhancement determined necessary to offset risk aversion. Assume, for example, that the
SEC determines that it only wants tips from whistleblowers who believe they have at least a five
percent probability of receiving an award, and that it estimates that a twenty percent
enhancement is necessary to offset the typical level of risk aversion experienced by this sort of
whistleblower. The SEC would then compute awards in individual cases by determining a value
for the whistleblower’s costs, denoted C, and plugging it into the following formula: A = (C
/.05)*1.20. Simplified, this equation indicates that the SEC should award an amount equal to
twenty-four times a whistleblower’s costs. If this multiple were publicized, and if it were based on
an accurate assessment of the discount that whistleblowers with tips of the desired strength would
apply to an anticipated award based on risk aversion, rational actors who believe their tips have
a five percent or greater probability of leading to an award would reliably be incentivized to report,
and rational actors with weaker tips would not.
108. The hybrid percentage/dollar approach envisioned in the proposed rule resembles a
common method used by courts in setting plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in class actions: courts calculate
fees in the first instance as a percentage of the recovery, but compare the dollar value of the award
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It becomes unattractive only if we assume that the SEC will
intentionally or inadvertently get the adjustments wrong, or will
consume so many resources in making the adjustments that the change
would produce more costs than benefits. The SEC could use the
authority to make downward adjustments to eliminate unnecessary
excess payouts to whistleblowers and to discourage undesirable tips,
both laudable objectives;109 but downward adjustments could also
discourage even desirable tips if they go too far.110 Is this is a significant
concern?
The ability of the SEC to go “too far” is limited in the proposed
rule. The SEC would only be authorized to make downward
adjustments based on dollar amounts in cases likely to lead to the
collection of $100 million or more in monetary penalties, and the SEC
could not adjust the award below $30 million or ten percent of the
collected monetary penalties, whichever is higher. Of course, there may
be situations where a potential whistleblower would not find it rational
to come forward unless he expected to be awarded more than $30
million in the event a covered action resulted from his tip. But the
potential impact of the rule will be limited to this subset, and the costs
of administering the adjustment would be cabined concomitantly.
How would those falling within this subset be affected?
Commissioner Jackson has suggested that these individuals would be
deterred from reporting on the margins because the change would
increase the uncertainty surrounding a potential whistleblower’s
expected award calculation, leading to a larger risk discount.111 The
added uncertainty, he has observed, would include political
uncertainty: even if whistleblowers trust the current SEC to use the
discretion the proposed rule affords wisely, a future SEC may be hostile
to the program.112
thus generated to an estimate of the attorneys’ actual costs (a “lodestar”) to check whether
adjustment is warranted. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and
Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 267 (2010);
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions: 2009-2013, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 937, 945
(2017).
109. The potential for awards in excess of $30 million to prompt undesirable tips is exacerbated
due to the lottery mentality. Supra note 97 and accompanying text.
110. Upward adjustments, if too great, could also operate to encourage undesirable tips. Given
that the objections to the proposed revisions to Rule 21F-6 focus on downward adjustments, I focus
on downward adjustments in the text.
111. See Jackson, supra note 8:
[B]y increasing the uncertainty associated with the amounts of our awards, we decrease
the value of those payments to whistleblowers at the moment when they decide whether
to come forward—so we can expect that, under this proposal, fewer will come forward,
and fewer frauds will be discovered in time to protect investors.
112. Id.
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A close examination of the reality of the program today suggests
that Commissioner Jackson’s concerns, while theoretically sound, may
be practically unwarranted. As previously explained, it is
monumentally difficult for a whistleblower to predict with any
confidence the percentage they will be awarded within the ten to thirty
percent range under existing practice. Not only is the SEC incredibly
opaque concerning the weight it assigns to the various factors identified
in the rule,113 it rarely ever discloses the percentage it has awarded. In
those cases leading to whistleblower awards of $1 million or more, the
SEC has never revealed the percentage awarded. In light of this, it is
likely that whistleblowers today already assume conservatively that
they will receive only ten percent of monetary penalties collected. If this
is the case, then the proposed rule revisions will not have the effect
Commissioner Jackson fears, given that they would not permit
adjustments below the ten percent statutory floor.
The proposed revisions might actually do more to alleviate
uncertainty than exacerbate it. To see this, consider why it might be
that the SEC behaves in such a nontransparent way in setting award
percentages, despite the negative impact on the whistleblower program.
Information about percentages would be much more helpful than
information about the dollar amount of the awards, which the SEC does
routinely publish, because dollar amounts are dependent on the
monetary sanctions collected in a particular case (the details of which
are almost always redacted); potential whistleblowers have no basis to
assume that their tips will lead to comparable collections, and hence
comparable awards. Publishing percentages along with the criteria that
the SEC used to determine the percentages would be more helpful
because it would allow whistleblowers to better predict the percentage
they would be awarded, which they could then apply to the collections
they anticipate in order to determine if blowing the whistle is worth the
risk. There is no reason the SEC could not publish this information
while still maintaining whistleblower confidentiality. Indeed, revealing
dollar amounts is more likely to provide information that would allow
someone to guess at a whistleblower’s identity than would revealing
percentages. So why does the SEC choose to report dollar amounts
rather than percentages?

113. The IRS Whistleblower Program is much more transparent regarding the impact of
plus/minus factors on the percentage awarded. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7623-4 (2019) (explaining that
vis-à-vis whistleblowers who provided substantial assistance, the IRS begins at fifteen percent,
then considers positive factors, which can operate to increase the award to twenty-two or thirty
percent; the IRS next considers the presence and significance of any negative factors, which may
lead it to reduce a twenty-two percent award to eighteen percent, or reduce a thirty percent award
to twenty-six percent or twenty-two percent).
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A cynic might suggest that those within the SEC responsible for
determining award percentages enjoy their power to dole out (or
withhold) significant sums of government money to whistleblowers
without public scrutiny. Perhaps they use their discretion to richly
reward their friends and punish their enemies—awarding the former
the statutory maximum percentage and the latter the statutory
minimum percentage. I doubt this is the case,114 but the public has no
way of knowing for sure.
A less cynical, and in my view more plausible, explanation is
that the SEC is already taking dollar amounts into account in setting
awards because, well, it makes good sense to do so. My guess is that if
the percentages were disclosed, we would observe an inverse
relationship between the percentage awarded by the SEC to
whistleblowers in a covered action and the monetary penalties
collected, holding all else equal, with the percentages especially
sensitive to dollar amounts when the awards are very small or very
large (and thus particularly likely to be insufficient to induce reporting
or, conversely, beyond what is necessary to induce reporting, given
whistleblowers’ costs).115 The SEC may keep the percentages it awards
confidential in order to avoid criticism that it is not complying with Rule
21F-6, which as currently written does not permit consideration of the
dollar value of the award.116 If this reading of the tea leaves is correct,
the SEC might become more transparent regarding the percentages it
is awarding, and why, if Rule 21F-6 is changed to permit the
consideration of dollar amounts.
To be sure, revealing both the dollar amount and the percentage
awarded in a particular covered action would jeopardize whistleblower
114. I believe that most individuals at the SEC are dedicated public servants with a high level
of moral integrity. Moreover, there are several layers of internal review of award determinations
within the SEC that should operate to constrain this sort of self-serving behavior, as well as the
threat of Congressional oversight. See WP 2018 REPORT, supra note 20, at 14 (“Most award claim
recommendations . . . generally go through a multi-tiered, robust review process, including review
and comment by Enforcement’s Office Chief Counsel and the Commission’s Office of General
Counsel.”).
115. Courts appear to behave in a similar way when awarding class counsel fees. Empirical
studies reveal that courts award smaller percentages the higher the dollar value of a settlement.
See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 108, at 263–65 (documenting the existence of a scaling effect,
in which the fee percentage decreases as the class recovery increases); Eisenberg et al., supra note
108, at 947–48 (same).
116. It may be that the SEC is proposing these changes because it has faced criticism from
award claimants contesting the percentage awarded them on precisely this ground. See, e.g., Order
Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 73174, at 3 n.4 (Sept. 22,
2014) https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2014/34-73174.pdf [https://perma.cc/686G-437J] (reporting
that a $30 million award claimant “suggested that a factor beyond those specified in Rule 21F-6
may have been considered” in setting the award percentage and complained that his “award is
below the average percentage amount awarded to other successful claimants to date”).
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confidentiality because it would make it easy to identify the
enforcement action to which the award relates. The SEC may believe
that reporting high dollar awards does more to elicit press coverage of
the program than would disclosing percentages alone, and that this, in
turn, elicits more tips. But cheaper forms of advertising exist, and it is
not clear that the publicity generated by media coverage of extremely
large whistleblower awards is the type the SEC should seek to generate.
Individuals with serious suspicions about wrongdoing are likely to visit
the SEC’s website and learn of the WP there. The tips elicited because
of a news story reporting that the SEC awarded a whistleblower an eyepopping amount of money are more likely to come from individuals who
have been swept up in a “lottery mentality”: the tips elicited may be
large in quantity, but are likely to be low in quality, potentially
burdening the SEC more than they help.117 In any event, the SEC could
reveal information about dollar amounts and percentages in a way that
would not jeopardize whistleblower confidentiality. For example, the
SEC could provide aggregated data about the dollar amounts of awards
(for example, “Over the past year we have awarded over $100 million to
seven individuals”), or provide a vague description or general range of
the dollar magnitude of the award along with the percentage in
particular cases (for example, “Today we ordered a twenty percent
award based on X, Y, and Z factors, which will yield a multi-million
dollar payout”).
For the foregoing reasons, I support the proposed revisions to
Rule 21F-6.118 But I also view them as incomplete. The analysis in the
last Section reveals another glaring problem with the award calculation
methodology that ought to be addressed: whistleblower awards should
be tied to the value of the punishment imposed in the covered action
resulting from the whistleblower’s tip, rather than the amount of
monetary penalties collected. This would better align a whistleblower’s
incentive to tip with what should be the SEC’s enforcement priority—
catching the most egregious misconduct, not just the misconduct that is
most likely to result in the collection of large monetary penalties.119
117. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
118. Indeed, I might even support a rule change allowing the SEC to consider dollar amounts,
within the statutory ten to thirty percent parameters, in all cases, not just those cases that fall at
the extreme margin. But requiring the SEC to consider the incentive effects of the dollar value of
awards in all cases would impose greater administrative costs on the agency, and it would create
greater opportunities for distortion if the SEC exercised its adjustment power unwisely. The
benefits of such a change might be worth it, but this presents a harder question—one I do not
attempt to resolve here.
119. Derivative litigation provides an apt analogy: courts recognize that plaintiffs’ attorneys
can generate value for a company even when they reach non-monetary settlements, and thus
require the corporation to pay attorneys’ fees in such cases under the substantial benefit variant
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Congressional action would be required to untether the calculation of
the ten percent floor and thirty percent ceiling from monetary penalties
collected, but nothing in the Dodd-Frank Act prevents the SEC from
adopting a rule that would allow it to consider the value of nonmonetary
penalties in deciding what the award amount should be within the
statutory bounds. Indeed, the existing Rule 21F-6 criteria are best read
to permit the SEC to take this into account already.120 But the rule could
and should be revised to require that the SEC do so explicitly and in
every case.
This could be achieved by requiring the SEC to apply the
percentage it otherwise determines appropriate using existing Rule
21F-6 criteria to the combined value of the monetary and nonmonetary
penalties imposed in the case, in order to arrive at the ideal
whistleblower award amount.121 The SEC would then be required to
make payments to the whistleblower as monetary penalties are
collected until that dollar target is hit, subject to the thirty percent
statutory ceiling. This approach would require that the SEC assign a
dollar value equivalent to nonmonetary penalties. This would be a
difficult but worthwhile exercise. Not only would it improve the
whistleblower program by tying anticipated awards more closely to the
SEC’s deterrence objectives, but it would also force the SEC to reflect
deliberatively on the relative value of the various remedial tools
available to it, perhaps leading to better enforcement choices. It might
also benefit the SEC in its ongoing conversation with Congress
regarding the proper lens through which to evaluate the SEC’s
enforcement program. The SEC has repeatedly urged Congress not to
evaluate the effectiveness of its enforcement program by looking
narrowly at quantitative measures like monetary penalties collected,
emphasizing how important nonmonetary penalties can be in
promoting deterrence.122 Congress might be more willing to heed this
advice if the value of nonmonetary penalties could be expressed using a
common, objective metric. If assigning a monetary equivalent to
nonmonetary penalties were viewed as too difficult, however, a simpler
of the common fund rule. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and
Corporate Governance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (1999).
120. One of the sub-factors that the SEC may consider when addressing the impact of the tip
on its “programmatic interest in deterring violations of the securities laws” is “the degree to which
an award encourages the submission of high quality information from whistleblowers by
appropriately rewarding whistleblowers’ submission of significant information and assistance,
even in cases where the monetary sanctions available for collection are limited.” 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.21F-6(a)(3)(ii) (2019) (emphasis added).
121. This amount would be subject to adjustment if called for under the SEC’s proposed
revisions to Rule 21F-6.
122. See sources cited supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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alternative exists. Rule 21F-6 could be revised to require an upward
adjustment of the award percentage in the event a covered action
involved the imposition of substantial nonmonetary penalties. A
whistleblower’s entitlement to this upward adjustment, and its
magnitude, should be clear and predictable.
More broadly, the SEC should be more transparent about the
weight it assigns to the Rule 21F-6 criteria and about the actual
percentages that it is awarding in covered actions. As noted above, this
might occur naturally if Rule 21F-6 is revised to allow the SEC to
consider dollar amounts in extreme cases, but to ensure greater
transparency the SEC should be required to publish the percentage
awarded to whistleblowers in every covered action as well to disclose in
greater detail how and why it arrived at the percentage it did, albeit in
a manner that would not jeopardize the whistleblower’s
confidentiality.123 By increasing the predictability of award
percentages, this change would reduce the risk discount potential
whistleblowers would otherwise apply to an expected award.
CONCLUSION
Any reform to the whistleblower award calculation methodology
should be evaluated in terms of how well it advances the goals of the
WP. This Article posits that the WP is designed to incentivize
individuals to submit tips to the SEC that will advance the SEC’s
deterrence mission without simultaneously encouraging tips that will
detract from that mission. The current percentage methodology for
calculating whistleblower awards creates differential incentives to
report based on tip desirability, but it fails to consider whether the
award amounts produced by the methodology will actually be sufficient
to elicit desirable tips or, conversely, will be higher than necessary to
do so and possibly even so high as to encourage undesirable tips. That
will depend on how the anticipated dollar amount of a potential award
compares to the costs whistleblowers expect to bear by coming forward.
The proposed changes to Rule 21F-6 would remedy this
shortcoming by allowing the SEC to consider the dollar amount of
awards produced by the percentage method, at least in a subset of cases,
and to make adjustments in light of the incentive effects. While the
reform gives the SEC additional discretion in setting award amounts,
it is not clear that the result will be increased uncertainty as
Commissioner Jackson has warned; to the contrary, the reform may
lead the SEC to be more transparent regarding how it determines
123. See supra text following note 117.
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award amounts than it is today. Under current practice, the SEC
routinely discloses the dollar amount of awards but almost never
discloses the percentage, an odd practice given that disclosing
percentages would allow potential whistleblowers to anticipate their
awards with greater certainty. If the SEC is withholding information
about percentages to hide the fact that it is already taking dollar
amounts into account in setting the award percentage, the reform will
reduce this incentive for obfuscation.
While I support the SEC’s proposed reforms to Rule 21F-6, the
analysis in this Article suggests at least two more that should be
considered. First, the SEC should be required to be more transparent
about the percentages it is awarding and why. Increasing the
predictability of award amounts will cause potential whistleblowers to
apply a lower risk discount to their expected awards. Second, reforms
that would better tie whistleblower awards to penalties imposed, as
opposed to monetary penalties collected, should be considered. Such
reforms would better align a whistleblower’s incentive to tip with the
SEC’s deterrence mission and could produce collateral benefits for the
agency.
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APPENDIX A
Rule 21F-6. Criteria for determining amount of award.
In exercising its discretion to determine the appropriate award
percentage, the Commission may consider the following factors in
relation to the unique facts and circumstances of each case, and may
increase or decrease the award percentage based on its analysis of these
factors. In the event that awards are determined for multiple
whistleblowers in connection [sic] an action, these factors will be used
to determine the relative allocation of awards among the
whistleblowers.
(a) Factors that may increase the amount of a whistleblower’s
award. In determining whether to increase the amount of an award,
the Commission will consider the following factors, which are
not listed in order of importance.
(1) Significance of the information provided by the
whistleblower. The Commission will assess the significance of
the information provided by a whistleblower to the success of the
Commission action or related action. In considering this factor,
the Commission may take into account, among other things:
(i) The nature of the information provided by the whistleblower
and how it related to the successful enforcement action,
including whether the reliability and completeness of the
information provided to the Commission by the whistleblower
resulted in the conservation of Commission resources;
(ii) The degree to which the information provided by the
whistleblower supported one or more successful claims brought
in the Commission or related action.
(2) Assistance provided by the whistleblower. The
Commission will assess the degree of assistance provided by the
whistleblower and any legal representative of the whistleblower
in the Commission action or related action. In considering this
factor, the Commission may take into account, among other
things:
(i) Whether the whistleblower provided ongoing, extensive, and
timely cooperation and assistance by, for example, helping to
explain complex transactions, interpreting key evidence, or
identifying new and productive lines of inquiry;
(ii) The timeliness of the whistleblower’s initial report to the
Commission or to an internal compliance or reporting system of
business organizations committing, or impacted by, the
securities violations, where appropriate;
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(iii) The resources conserved as a result of the whistleblower’s
assistance;
(iv) Whether the whistleblower appropriately encouraged or
authorized others to assist the staff of the Commission who
might otherwise not have participated in the investigation or
related action;
(v) The efforts undertaken by the whistleblower to remediate
the harm caused by the violations, including assisting the
authorities in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities of
the violations; and
(vi) Any unique hardships experienced by the whistleblower as
a result of his or her reporting and assisting in the
enforcement action.
(3) Law enforcement interest. The Commission will assess its
programmatic interest in deterring violations of the securities
laws by making awards to whistleblowers who provide
information that leads to the successful enforcement of such laws.
In considering this factor, the Commission may take into account,
among other things:
(i) The degree to which an award enhances the Commission’s
ability to enforce the Federal securities laws and protect
investors; and
(ii) The degree to which an award encourages the submission of
high quality information from whistleblowers by appropriately
rewarding whistleblowers’ submission of significant information
and assistance, even in cases where the monetary sanctions
available for collection are limited or potential monetary
sanctions were reduced or eliminated by the Commission
because an entity self-reported a securities violation following
the whistleblower’s related internal disclosure, report, or
submission.
(iii) Whether the subject matter of the action is a Commission
priority, whether the reported misconduct involves regulated
entities or fiduciaries, whether the whistleblower exposed an
industry-wide practice, the type and severity of the securities
violations, the age and duration of misconduct, the number of
violations, and the isolated, repetitive, or ongoing nature of the
violations; and
(iv) The dangers to investors or others presented by the
underlying violations involved in the enforcement action,
including the amount of harm or potential harm caused by the
underlying violations, the type of harm resulting from or
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threatened by the underlying violations, and the number of
individuals or entities harmed.
(4) Participation in internal compliance systems. The
Commission will assess whether, and the extent to which, the
whistleblower and any legal representative of the whistleblower
participated in internal compliance systems. In considering this
factor, the Commission may take into account, among other
things:
(i) Whether, and the extent to which, a whistleblower reported
the
possible
securities
violations
through
internal
whistleblower, legal or compliance procedures before, or at the
same time as, reporting them to the Commission; and
(ii) Whether, and the extent to which, a whistleblower assisted
any internal investigation or inquiry concerning the reported
securities violations.
(b) Factors that may decrease the amount of a whistleblower’s
award. In determining whether to decrease the amount of an award,
the Commission will consider the following factors, which are
not listed in order of importance.
(1) Culpability. The Commission will assess the culpability or
involvement of the whistleblower in matters associated with the
Commission’s action or related actions. In considering this factor,
the Commission may take into account, among other things:
(i) The whistleblower’s role in the securities violations;
(ii) The whistleblower’s education, training, experience, and
position of responsibility at the time the violations occurred;
(iii) Whether the whistleblower acted with scienter, both
generally and in relation to others who participated in the
violations;
(iv) Whether the whistleblower financially benefitted from the
violations;
(v) Whether the whistleblower is a recidivist;
(vi) The egregiousness of the underlying fraud committed by the
whistleblower; and
(vii) Whether the whistleblower knowingly interfered with the
Commission’s investigation of the violations or related
enforcement actions.
(2) Unreasonable reporting delay. The Commission will assess
whether the whistleblower unreasonably delayed reporting the
securities violations. In considering this factor, the Commission
may take into account, among other things:
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(i) Whether the whistleblower was aware of the relevant facts
but failed to take reasonable steps to report or prevent the
violations from occurring or continuing;
(ii) Whether the whistleblower was aware of the relevant facts
but only reported them after learning about a related inquiry,
investigation, or enforcement action; and
(iii) Whether there was a legitimate reason for the
whistleblower to delay reporting the violations.
(3) Interference with internal compliance and reporting
systems. The Commission will assess, in cases where the
whistleblower interacted with his or her entity’s internal
compliance or reporting system, whether the whistleblower
undermined the integrity of such system. In considering this
factor, the Commission will take into account whether there is
evidence provided to the Commission that the whistleblower
knowingly:
(i) Interfered with an entity’s established legal, compliance, or
audit procedures to prevent or delay detection of the reported
securities violation;
(ii) Made
any material false,
fictitious,
or
fraudulent
statements or representations that hindered an entity’s efforts
to detect, investigate, or remediate the reported securities
violations; and
(iii) Provided any false writing or document knowing the
writing or document contained any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or entries that hindered an entity’s efforts to detect,
investigate, or remediate the reported securities violations.
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FIGURE 1: INDIVIDUAL AWARDS AS OF FISCAL YEAR 2018
(IN THOUSANDS)
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Data reflects the fifty-two individual awards announced by the SEC from the
inception of the WP to the end of FY2018 with an estimated payout amount
disclosed. When an estimated payout range was disclosed, the midpoint was used.

